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1 Introduction
Mobility is often considered as constraining local income redistribution in a federal sys-
tem. The tax competition literature generally argues that local redistribution is impossi-
ble or at least dicult to implement if the population is mobile, as rich taxpayers evade
high tax jurisdictions by moving to low tax jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the majority of
high-income countries are organized as federations, where subnational jurisdictions are
endowed with a certain level of autonomy concerning local taxes and redistribution.
In this paper, we ask which factors play a role for the functioning of local redistri-
bution and whether a substantial amount of local redistribution is feasible despite the
mobility of taxpayers. To this aim we analyze an equilibrium model of local income tax-
ation, where taxpayers dier with respect to income and their degree of mobility. Part
of the population can move freely between jurisdictions. Taxes are determined endoge-
nously by voting and are used for redistribution in form of a lump-sum grant to every
taxpayer. Thus, our model incorporates two equilibrium concepts: a locational and a
political equilibrium. In the locational equilibrium every taxpayer is content with the
tax-grant package in the chosen jurisdiction and does not want to move. In the political
equilibrium tax rates are determined by inequality (median to mean ratio) in the juris-
diction. These two equilibrium concepts have been found to produce so called "income
stratication" patterns (see e.g. Epple and Romer (1991), Hansen and Kessler (2001)
or Schmidheiny (2006b)), which means that taxpayers sort themselves into jurisdictions
according to income. In a stratied equilibrium taxpayers with the highest income live
in low tax jurisdictions, taxpayers with middle income in medium tax jurisdictions, etc.
Stratication does not mean that there is no redistribution at all. Dierences between
tax rates and thus redistribution arise endogenously through voting. Depending on how
large the dierences between jurisdictional tax rates become, the less redistribution is
feasible between the rich and the poor.
We contribute to the growing literature on stratication by introducing the degree
of mobility explicitely into the redistribution model. This allows us to determine the
inuence of the degree of mobility on income stratication and thus on redistribution.
Furthermore, the model helps to show which groups of individuals may or may not prot
from income stratication. Our analysis yields three important results.
First, it predicts that if the general level of mobility is low, stratication cannot arise
because rich taxpayers will be too unequal between each other relative to the group of
poorer taxpayers. In this case voting does not lead to a lower tax rate in the jurisdiction
where the rich live than elsewhere. This result is in the spirit of Hansen and Kessler
(2001) who argue that tax havens only arise in small countries as there is less inequality
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between the super rich than between super rich and medium rich.
Second, we nd that if only part of the population is immobile, income stratication
arises. The intuition is that there is more inequality and thus redistribution in the
jurisdiction where the poor decide to live when some rich individuals are unable to
move. The immobile rich are exploited by the poor mobile taxpayers in the high tax
jurisdiction. The groups that prot from this kind of income stratication are mobile
individuals, but also the rich immobile in the low tax jurisdiction and the poor immobile
in the high tax jurisdiction. The rich immobile in the high tax jurisdiction loose when
compared to a situation where everyone is mobile because they now have to pay higher
taxes which they cannot escape. The poor immobile living in the low tax jurisdiction
also loose because they obtain lower grants and have to pay higher rents. Note that very
high levels of immobility logically lead to less income stratication as only few people
move so that tax rates become rather similar. Thus our model predicts a non-linear
(hump shaped) pattern between mobility and income stratication which may help to
explain empirically often insignicant results and signs when analyzing the relationship
between inequality and redistribution (see Benabou (2002) for a review).
Third, we analyze the inuence of existing aggregate income inequality in the regional
economy (a region consisting of several separate jurisdictions) on the income stratication
between local jurisdictions. We nd that if aggregate inequality is high there is always a
stratication outcome. Intuitively, a higher aggregate income inequalty increases ex-ante
dierences between jurisdictions and makes stratication more likely for every degree of
mobility.
These three theoretical results suggest that local income redistribution in a federal
system is only eective if aggregate income inequality is not too high and mobility is
either relatively high or relatively low.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses how our contribution is
related to the existing literature. Section 3 describes the model of local redistribution. In
Section 4 we formally analyze the equilibrium of the model and derive the main results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In his seminal paper Tiebout (1956) (later formalized by Ellickson (1971) and criticized
by Epple and Zelenitz (1981)) argues that a decentralized system of taxation and public
goods provision allows citizens to "shop among jurisdictions" according to their prefer-
ence. A phenomenon that is known as "Tiebout sorting". Empirically, Oates (1969) nds
evidence for Tiebout sorting, whereas Pollakowski (1973) shows that his initial results
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are not very robust. More recently Rhode and Strumpf (2003) nd that heterogeneity of
public goods across communities decreases over time which is against the predictions of
an extended Tiebout model. The later theoretical literature therefore deviates explicitely
from the assumptions of the Tiebout model to test its robustness (see e.g. Tiebout-like
models incoporating an explicit voting process like Westho (1977), Westho (1979) or
with an explicit land market like Rose-Ackerman (1979) and Bucovetsky (1982)).
More recently, it has become quite standard to combine an explicit voting process
with a migrational decision a la Tiebout to obtain a general equilibrium approach. In
this approach, individuals typically move to a preferred jurisdiction in a rst stage and
there is majority voting over scal policy and taxes in a second stage. When moving
individuals foresee the outcome of majority voting in the second stage, such that once
an equilibrium is reached, they have no further incentive to move. The present paper
follows such an approach and we consider a model of income taxation. In contrast, a
lot of authors analyze models of property taxation which is the dominant form of local
public nance in the US (see Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), Epple, Filimon, and
Romer (1993), Nechyba (1997) or Epple and Platt (1998)). Epple and Romer (1991)
analyze the inuence of a special aspect of mobility in a setting with property taxation.
More specically they dierentiate between two main cases: (1) a model where there are
only renters who rent houses from absentee landlords and (2) a model with homeowners
who consider also the capital gains or losses they will incur as a result of a change in the
net-of-tax price of housing induced by a change in the level of redistributive taxation.
The conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of the model are the same in both
cases, but an owner with a given endowed income will prefer a lower level of redistributive
taxation than a renter with the same income.
Despite the frequent focus on property taxation, there are some notable exceptions
that analyze general equilibrium models of local public good provision with income taxa-
tion (see Goodspeed (1986), Goodspeed (1989), Hansen and Kessler (2001), Kessler and
Lulfesmann (2005) and Schmidheiny (2006b)). Those contributions all have a slightly
dierent focus to ours in the sense that they do not analyze the inuence of dierent de-
grees of mobility on stratication. Goodspeed (1986) and Goodspeed (1989) derives the
conditions for existence of an equilibrium in a metropolitan model with income taxation,
congestible public goods and a housing market. He also estimates the welfare loss from
changing from a head tax to a proportional income tax. However, he does not consider
the inuence of dierent mobility patterns. Hansen and Kessler (2001) focus on explain-
ing the existence of tax havens depending on the size of a country (or jurisdiction). They
show that if there is a jurisdiction of a very small size which can accomodate the most
auent individuals, a stratication equilibrium can arise. In Hansen and Kessler (2001)
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the decisive characteristic of a jurisdiction which leads to stratication of individuals
with respect to income is the dierence in country (or jurisdictional) size, whereas in our
setting the fraction of the non-mobile population plays a similar crucial role. Alterna-
tively, Kessler and Lulfesmann (2005) show that stratication equilibria can be due to
dierent preferences for public goods. Finally, analyzing a richer model where individuals
dier in both income and preferences for housing, Schmidheiny (2006b) derives imper-
fect income segregation. All these contributions, like ours, show the possible existence
of stratication equilibria. However the approach presented in this paper is dierent as
it is the fraction of immobile individuals which matters for stratication to occur. This
paper consequently extends existing work on income stratication equilibria in models
with income taxation.
Similarly to Epple and Romer (1991) and Hansen and Kessler (2001) we analyze a
purely redistributive setting without considering a public good which could enter the util-
ity function explicitely. Grossmann (2002) argues that the distinction between a purely
redistributive setting versus a public goods setting matters in models of majority voting
because the consequences for the nature of the link between inequality and redistribu-
tion (or the size of government) dier between those settings. In a redistributive setting
higher income inequality leads to more redistribution in equilibrium, whereas in a public
goods setting a higher income inequality may lead to less redistribution. Empirically, the
relationship between income inequality and redistribution has been investigated by many
authors with rather inconclusive results (see, among others, Perotti (1994) or Persson
and Tabellini (1994)). Benabou (2002) presents a review of the results of this strand
of literature and nds that "the results are rather disappointing: the eect of income
distribution on transfers and taxes is rarely signicant, and its sign varies from one study
or even one specication to another."1 However, some studies nd evidence in favor of
the redistributive setting (see e.g. Milanovic (2000) or Perotti (1996)). Being aware of
the criticism we still opt for a redistributive setting, as our main interest is to assess the
implications of mobility on taxation and on opportunities for income redistribution via
grants.
We look at jurisdictions in a metropolitan area centered around a big city, where all
individuals go to work in the same place but live in dierent jurisdictions. Therefore,
we neglect possible eects coming from local productivity dierences which would be
important when looking at jurisdictions on a higher level such as countries. (Productivity
dierences are taken into account in models of spatial asset pricing, see e.g. Ortalo-Magne
and Prat (2008)). Furthermore, we look at a static model which does not allow for growth
and human capital accumulation (eects which are analyzed in recent contributions such
1See Benabou (2002), p. 24.
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as Benabou (1996a), Benabou (1996b), Benabou (1996c), Glomm and Laguno (1999),
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) or Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2009)). Given our focus
on redistributive government expenditures we leave such considerations out as they are
especially interesting when analyzing schooling expenditures and public investments.
One main implication of our model is that in equilibrium individuals may be strat-
ied with respect to income classes. In the empirical literature we indeed nd some
evidence for income stratication patterns. Using data from US federal states, Bakija
and Slemrod (2004) show that wealthy retirees try to avoid high state taxes by changing
their state of residence. For the special case of Switzerland, where cantons and also
communities enjoy a relatively high tax autonomy Pommerehne, Kirchgassner, and Feld
(1996) and Feld and Kirchgassner (2001) nd evidence for some income stratication
due to dierences in taxes. However, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2006) analyze micro data
and do not nd signicant tax-induced migration in Switzerland. Brulhart and Jametti
(2006) analyze the existence of vertical versus horizontal tax externalities and nd that
the former dominate the latter, which might be evidence for tax competition between
communities and cantons. These studies deserve credit for showing that tax dierences
and stratication occur, when jurisdictions enjoy scal autonomy and they show to what
extent empirically individuals react to such tax dierences by migration. However, they
assume that tax rates are set exogenously by a local government (benevolent or not).
It is not a priori clear how such results have to be interpreted when taxes are set en-
dogenously, as for example by a voting process where the residents have to decide for
some political candidate who proposes a certain tax policy (as in the case of majority
voting). Thus, more recently, a lot of authors attempted to structurally estimate or
calibrate equilibrium models of local jurisdictions where voting is endogenous (see Epple
and Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001), Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004),
Bajari and Kahn (2005), Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh (2002), Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf,
and Walsh (2004), Ferreyra (2007), Ferreira (2004) and for Switzerland Schmidheiny
(2006a)). These contributions generally nd strong evidence for income stratication
between local jurisdictions.
The focus of our paper is on the inuence of mobility patterns on taxation and re-
distribution. Therefore, we also contribute to the part of the literature which makes
predictions about the inuence of the degree of mobility on local taxation and the possi-
bility of redistributive policies at the local level. In the "race-to-the-bottom" literature
a higher mobility typically leads to lower taxes and less redistribution (see Brueckner
(2000)). Empirical studies analyzing whether this breakdown of the welfare state really
occurs yield dierent results. Brown and Oates (1985) and Feldstein and Wrobel (1998)
nd evidence for tax avoidance in the US similar to the one presented above and thus
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argue that redistribution should be taken out by the central government only. However,
for Switzerland Feld (2000) nds that a considerable amount of redistribution takes
place at the local level despite high mobility of tax payers and strong tax competition.
Alternatively, Lee (2007) presents a political-support approach to redistribution in a
federation, which leads to a dierent conclusion than the standard "race to the bottom"
models. He nds that depending on the cost of housing (which is equivalent to mobility
costs in his model), mobility may increase or decrease income redistribution.
Our theoretical model helps to show which groups with dierent degrees of mobility
may or may not prot from income stratication and our analysis predicts a non-linear
pattern between mobility and income stratication (redistribution) which may serve as
a possible explanation for rather inconsistent empirical results.
3 The Model
We look at a system of integrated and independent jurisdictions denoted j = 1; :::; J in
an economy, all having the same size. The jurisdictions are politically independent in the
sense that each jurisdiction determines scal policy in an autonomous way. We choose
a setting similar to recent contributions on stratication such as Hansen and Kessler
(2001) or Kessler and Lulfesmann (2005). But dierent from them, in our economy
jurisdictions distinguish themselves only by the fraction of mobile individuals.
We develop a model of redistribution to analyze the interaction between mobility, the
economy's income inequality, and political decisions on redistributive taxes. The most
important elements of the model are: (1) Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to
income so that there is a redistributional issue. (2) A jurisdiction's budget must balance.
(3) Migration is costless for the group of mobile individuals, i.e. in equilibrium mobile
persons must be unable to improve their positions by moving. (4) After settlement in a
specic jurisdictions, political decisions are determined by majority voting.
Denote the two groups of individuals in the economy by M for mobile and I for
immobile. The part of the immobile population in the economy is expressed as . Each
individual i, irrespective of its group membership, earns an exogenous income yi which
can be interpreted as location independent labor income. Each individual has to rent a
unit of housing from competitive absentee landlords to gain the right to live and vote in
a jurisdiction. Rents in jurisdiction j are denoted as rj. Housing demand is normalized
to unity. The utility V of an individual i is assumed to be linear in consumption ci.
Individuals in jurisdiction j have to pay proportional income taxes tj on their income y
i
and receive a (basic income) grant gj from the local government.
2 The budget constraint
2We might introduce local public good provision instead of pure redistribution. In this case the
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of individual i in jurisdiction j is thus
yi + gj = c
i + yitj + rj;
and indirect utility of individual i is equal to net income minus the rent
V (yi; tj; gj; rj) = (1  tj)yi + gj   rj:
In the economy income is distributed across all individuals according to the distri-
bution function F (y) with density f(y) > 0 and support [0;max y]. Individuals in each
group (M) and (I) have the same distribution of income. In every jurisdiction, the in-
come distribution for immobile individuals is given by f I(y). The income distribution
for mobile individuals for each jurisdiction j emerges endogenously after migration and
is denoted fMj (y). We normalize each jurisdiction's size in the economy to unity. Con-
sequently,  represents the percentage of immobile individuals (I) in each jurisdiction.
From the viewpoint of mobile individuals, the part of immobile individuals  determines
the "size" of the jurisdiction for them. Changes in average and median incomes de-
pend on the part of the mobile as well as the immobile population. Therefore, in our
setting, the part of immobile individuals has potentially dierent implications than a
jurisdiction's size in the model of Hansen and Kessler (2001). To insure that rents in
each jurisdiction of the economy are fully determined even when the population size in
each jurisdiction is xed, we suppose that competitive absentee landlords underbid each
other in the jurisdiction with the lowest mean income. More specically, in the jurisdic-
tion with the lowest mean income rents must equal the break-even price r for absentee
landlords.3
To focus on political motives for government and individual behavior, we abstract
from allocative reasons for public spending and assume that jurisdictions raise income
taxes for redistributive purposes only. The government has a redistribution policy in the
sense that it confers the same basic income or grant gj to every individual in the jurisdic-
tion. Proportional income taxes tj nance the grant gj. This "ability to pay principle" is
a common approximation of the progressive tax systems in use. A jurisdiction's budget
preference for public goods would play a role. Instead, we opt for a purely redistributive setting,
because the focus of our paper is the inuence of mobility and not the inuence of dierent preferences
for public goods.
3Technically we could also assume that there is an oversupply of houses.
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must balance and thus the budget constraint is
(tj   1
2
t2j)
max yZ
0
ydFj = gj:
where Fj denotes the endogenous measure of individuals with income y living in juris-
diction j such that average income in jurisdiction j can be expressed as yj =
R max y
0
ydFj.
The budget constraint equates local income tax revenues minus costs of raising public
funds. The term (tj   12t2j) outlines a concave per capita Laer-curve. Taxation is costly
with costs taking the form t2j=2 for simplicity. We assume that the jurisdictions all have
the same eciency in redistribution, i.e. the same costs of taxation.4 Because of the
binding budget constraint we can solve for the grant gj, which is then determined by the
chosen tax rate
gj =

tj   1
2
t2j

yj: (1a)
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium of the model is determined in two steps:
1. Mobile individuals choose the jurisdiction to live in which results in the locational
equilibrium.
2. All individuals in a jurisdiction cast their votes which results in the voting equilib-
rium.
When backward solving the model we look at the voting equilibrium rst. Given the
conditions resulting from the voting equilibrium we analyze the locational equilibrium.
Every voter i maximizes his indirect utility with respect to the tax rate and the basic
income grant given the budget constraint, i.e.
max
t
(1  tj)yi + (tj   1
2
t2j)yj   rj
Solving the individual maximization problem for tax rates leads to tj = 1  yiyj . In the
unique majority voting equilibrium the tax choice of the median voter is implemented,
i.e.
4As incomes are exogenous and pure redistribution is analyzed, the absence of costs of taxation would
allow for arbitrarily high tax rates. Deadweight losses of distortive taxation could also be introduced
more generally by endogenous labor supply. This would mainly complicate the analysis without changing
the qualitative results and providing additional insights.
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tj = 1 
ymj
yj
; (2)
and the level of redistribution in equilibrium is given by gj =
1
2
y2j (ymj )
2
yj
. Redistribution
will be higher in jurisdictions with high mean income and lower in jurisdictions with
a high median income. The political choice by the median voter determines the scal
package of taxes and grants (tj ; g

j ).
Given the equilibrium tax rate we can determine the locational equilibrium of how
the population locates over jurisdictions. In a locational equilibrium a mobile individual
i must be indierent beween jurisdictions. If individual i decides to settle in jurisdiction
j his/her utility must be greater or equal in jurisdictions j than in any other jurisdiction
denoted  j, i.e. V (yi; tj; gj; rj) > V (yi; t j; g j; r j): More precisely:
Denition 1 An equilibrium in the economy is dened as an income distribution of
mobile individuals in each jurisdiction fM

j (y), a scal policy package (t

j ; g

j ) and rental
fees rj for all j = 1; :::; J , such that (1) no mobile individual with income y
i living
in j has an incentive to move to another jurisdiction  j, that is, V (yi; tj ; gj ; rj ) >
V (yi; t j; g j; r j) and (2) tax rates tj = 1 
ymj
yj
reect the median voters choice in each
jurisdiction.
4.1 A symmetric equilibrium
First, we show that independent of the part of immobile individuals , there always
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all jurisdictions implement the same scal policy
package, (tj; gj), and rents, rj, as well as average incomes, yj are the same across all
jurisdictions.
Suppose that the population is distributed symmetrically over all jurisdictions in the
economy such that in each jurisdiction the local income distribution of mobile individ-
uals is equal, i.e. fMj (y) = f
M(y) for all j = 1; :::; J . This is equivalent to saying that
median and average incomes are the same in all jurisdictions, independent of the part of
the population that is immobile . Therefore, tax rates and consequently also the level
of redistribution will be the same in each jurisdiction. The clearing of renting markets
implies that absentee landlords will set the same renting price denoted by r. Therefore
every mobile individual is indierent between jurisdictions and thus the presumed dis-
tribution fM(y) is an equilibrium outcome. The following Proposition summarizes this
nding (all proofs are relegated to the Appendix5):
5An Appendix with all proofs is available upon request from the authors.
10
Proposition 1 Independent of the part of immobile individuals  in the economy, a
symmetric equilibrium with identical scal policies (tj; gj) = (t
; g), identical rents rj =
r, and identical average incomes yj = y in all jurisdictions j = 1; :::; J always exists.
4.2 An asymmetric equilibrium
Another possibility is that jurisdictions oer dierent tax-grant packages, i.e. (tj; gj) 6=
(th; gh) for j; h = 1; :::j  1; j +1; :::; J and j 6= h. If (tj; gj) 6= (th; gh) mobile individuals
may sort themselves into dierent jurisdictions: a phenomenon called "income strati-
cation" in the literature. Stratication in this case depends on the part of the immobile
population as well as the income inequality measured as the ratio between median and
mean income.
To illustrate the possibility of such an asymmetric equilibrium, we focus for simplicity
on the case of two jurisdictions with (t1; g1) 6= (t2; g2). Suppose that jurisdiction j = 1
is a low tax (wealthy) jurisdiction, whereas jurisdiction j = 2 is a high tax (poor)
jurisdiction. In this case jurisdiction j = 1 must have a lower grant-rent dierential, i.e.
(t1; g1   r1) < (t2; g2   r2), because otherwise all mobile individuals would like to live in
the jurisdiction with low taxes and a high grant-rent dierential.
In an equilibrium both jurisdictions must be populated and there is no extra-space.
Thus, there must be a boundary individual with boundary income ~y who is just in-
dierent between the two jurisdictions. If an income stratication equilibrium exists,
all mobile individuals with income y > ~y will live in the low tax (wealthy) jurisdiction
j = 1 and all mobile individuals with y  ~y will live in the high tax (poor) jurisdiction
j = 2. Equation (2) shows that if t1 < t2 we must have
ym1
y1
>
ym2
y2
. This implies that for
stratication to occur income inequality must be higher in the low tax jurisdiction, as
summarized by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 A necessary condition for stratication is that income inequality, dened as
the ratio between median and mean income, is lower in the low tax jurisdiction.
In an income stratication equilibrium, the boundary individual with income ~y is the
mobile individual with the lowest income in jurisdiction j = 1 whereas in jurisdiction
j = 2 the individual with income ~y has the highest income among the mobile.
For the housing market to clear rents have to adjust such that exactly the fraction of
wealthiest mobile individuals, xM = 1  F (~y), wants to live in jurisdiction j = 1. Note
that xM depends on the immobile population  in both jurisdictions as they determine
how many people can live in each jurisdiction. In the case of two jurisdictions half
of the mobile individuals are considered wealthy while the other half are considered
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poor. Consequenlty, the fraction of wealthiest mobile individuals equals xM = 1
2
and the
boundary income equals the economy's median income, i.e. ~y = F 1(1
2
) = ym.6 Given
the boundary income and a stratication equilibrium, the distribution of income, the
mean and the median incomes in the two jurisdictions look as follows:
Lemma 2 Let ~y be the boundary income. In a stratication equilibrium the distributions
of income in jurisdictions j = 1 and j = 2 are
G1(y) =
(
F (y) y  ~y
(2  )F (y)  (1  ) y > ~y ;
G2(y) =
(
(2  )F (y) y  ~y
(1  ) + F (y) y > ~y :
The mean incomes in each jurisdiction are
y1 = 
max yZ
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1  )
max yZ
~y
yf(y)dy; (3)
y2 = 
max yZ
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1  )
~yZ
0
yf(y)dy; (4)
and the median incomes in each jurisdiction are
ym1 = F
 1

1
2
3  2
2  

(5)
ym2 = F
 1

1
2
1
2  

(6)
All further proofs and detailed derivations are relegated to the Appendix7. Note that
average incomes in j = 1 and j = 2 depend on the part of the immobile population
 and on the boundary income ~y, forming the lower respectively the upper bound of
the second integrals in (3) and (4). Median incomes (5) and (6) in both jurisdictions
only depend on the part of the immobile population. Given a stratication equilibrium,
increasing the part of immobile  in the economy "crowds out" rich renters from j = 1
to j = 2 thereby increasing the median voter's income ym2 . Similarly, increasing  in the
poor jurisdiction allows, ceteris paribus, relatively poor renters to live in j = 1 thereby
6Expressed dierently, the fraction of wealthiest mobile individuals is equal to the remaining space
in the low tax jurisdiction divided by the number of mobile from the economy's population, i.e. xM =
1 
2   =
1
2 .
7An Appendix with all proofs is available upon request from the authors.
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reducing ym1 .
As the mean and the median incomes in both jurisdiction depend on the part of
immobile in the economy, equilibrium tax rates also depend on , i.e. t1() = 1  y
m
1 ()
y1()
and t2() = 1   y
m
2 ()
y2()
. By the government budget constraint the grant is determined
as a function of , i.e. gj () =
 
tj()  12t2j ()

yj. How will rents be determined in
equilibrium? To see this consider the mobile individual with boundary income ~y who is
indierent beween jurisdiction j = 1 and j = 2, i.e.
V (t1(); g

1()  r1; ~y) = V (t2(); g2()  r2; ~y)
(1  t1())~y + g1()  r1 = (1  t2())~y + g2()  r2:
Note that r2 will be equal to the minimum rent r as absentee landlords only compete
for renters in the high tax jurisdiction.8 Thus, we have
r1   r = (t2()  t1())~y + g1()  g2() > 0
This equation shows that a stratication equilibrium is fully determined by the part of
the immobile population in the economy, . Furthermore, it is logical that a stratication
equilibrium can only exist, if the jurisdiction that we posited to be low tax (wealthy) in
the beginning really exhibits lower taxes in equilibrium (a more detailed derivation can
be found in the Appendix9):
Proposition 2 A stratication equilibrium exists if and only if t2() > t

1(), i.e.  is
such that the equilibrium tax rate in the poor jurisdiction is higher.
One might be tempted to think that there is always a stratication equilibrium for
any : If taxes in jurisdiction j = 1 are higher than in jurisdiction j = 2, jurisdiction
j = 2 might simply accommodate rich mobile individuals. This intuition is misleading,
because the migration could change the outcome of the voting processes, such that taxes
in jurisdiction 2 become higher relative to taxes in jurisdiction 1. Not every  can lead to
a stratication equilibrium. The key intuition is that a low fraction of immobile people
makes it more dicult for rich individuals to nd a tax haven where inequality is low
enough to achieve low tax rates in the voting process as shown in the following example:
Example 1 Suppose  = 0 (or close to zero), meaning that virtually everyone in the
population is mobile and the distribution of income is uniform but dierent over three
8Note that technically there is an innitesimally small oversupply of houses such that rents in juris-
diction 2 are determined, similar to the symmetric case. For notational simplicity we omit it from the
formulas.
9An Appendix with all proofs is available upon request from the authors.
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parts of the support, so that it is skewed to the right in a very stylized way:
f(y) =
8><>:
1
2
for 0  y  1
3
8
for 1 < y  2
1
8
for 2 < y  3
There is some baseline inequality in the economy as y = 9
8
> ym = 1. Suppose individuals
were stratied, such that the richest half lives in jurisdiction 1 and the poorest half lives
in jurisdiction 2. The boundary income in this case is ~y = ym = 1. This implies for
median incomes, mean incomes and thus for the tax rates in both jurisdictions:
ym1 =
5
3
, y1 =
7
4
) t1 =
1
21
ym2 =
1
2
, y2 =
1
2
) t2 = 0
Thus, the tax rate in jurisdiction 2 (poor jurisdiction) is lower. Figure 1 Panel A shows
the densities that would result for the two communities in this case. Intuitively the rich
would like to go in jurisdiction 2, but if all the rich go in this jurisdiction the voting
process will again yield a tax rate like in jurisdiction 1 now. The rich are unable to
gather in one of the jurisdictions and agree about a low tax rate because the inequality
between them is higher than the inequality between the poor. For  = 0 a statication
equilibrium cannot exist.
Now suppose everything that one third of the population is immobile ( = 1
3
). Under
the same assumptions we obtain:
ym1 =
23
15
, y1 =
37
24
) t1 =
1
185
ym2 =
3
5
, y2 =
17
24
) t2 =
13
85
Tax rates in the rich jurisdiction are now lower than in the poor jurisdiction so that
nobody wants to change his location ex-post. Figure 1 Panel B shows the densities that
would result for the two communities when  = 1
3
. The gray areas represent the part of the
population that is not mobile and therefore those areas are the same in both communities.
The resulting inequality after migration is lower in the rich jurisdiction and thus the tax
rate will be lower there. Income stratication constiutes an equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Existence of Stratication Equilibria: A simple Example
This example illustrates the potential role that mobility can play for the existence of
income stratication equilibria. Hansen and Kessler (2001) noted that if jurisdictions do
not have the same size and one jurisdiction is "small enough" then it is possible for the
rich to gather there and agree on a tax rate that is lower than in the "big" jurisdiction,
where inequality will be higher.10 Here, we note that even if the jurisdicitons all have
10The inuence of the degree of mobility in our model can be compared to the eect of the geographical
size in Hansen and Kessler (2001). They show that there is some threshold geographical size of a
jurisdiction or country such that if there is at least one jurisdiction with this size or a lower size, a
stratication equilibrium exists, independent of the precise distribution of income. Here, in this model,
the distribution of income as well as the degree of mobility matters for the existence of a stratication
equilibrium.
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the same size, the fact that part of the population is not mobile can lead to income
stratication.
If part of the population is immobile  > 0, there is much more inequality in the
jurisdiction where the poor decide to live, because some rich individuals there are not
able to move. Those immobile rich will be exploited by the poor mobile taxpayers. For
the mobile rich individuals the situation could possibly be even better than if everyone
was mobile, because they can separate in a low tax jurisdiction and pay less taxes. The
poor immobile living in the rich jurisdiction are probably also worse o, because they
obtain less grants and have to pay higher rents. Finally, the general level of mobility is
too low, stratication cannot arise, because rich individuals will be too unequal between
each other relative to a the group of poor individuals.
4.3 The relationship between mobility and income stratica-
tion
An interesting question is now: For what values of the fraction of immobile in the popu-
lation, , does a stratication equilibrium exist? Unfortunately, it is not possible to show
for which  a stratication equilibrium exists without assuming a specic income distri-
bution function. We propose to assume that income is distributed lognormally across
individuals. This assumption implies that the distribution of incomes is bounded below
and open above and that the biggest mass of individuals have relatively low incomes.11
It turns out that the part of immobile individuals  in the economy and the economy's
income inequality both have a distinguishible eect on the existence of a stratication
equilibrium. Given certain level of income inequality reected by the parameter  for
the lognormal distribution12, we can dene a treshold ~ for the part of the immobile
population implicitly:
Proposition 3 For any given nite parameter  for the lognormal distribution, there is
a unique threshold for the degree of mobility ~ implicitly dened by
t2   t1 = 1
exp
 
2
2
  exp  p2 erf 1  1 2 
[+ 2(1  )()]  
exp
  p2 erf 1  1 
2 

[+ 2(1  ) (1  ())]
!
(7)
= 0:
11As income distributions are usually skewed to the right the lognormal distribution has been found
to approximate true income distributions quite closely and has been applied as a reasonably good
characterization by other authors from the eld (for example Epple and Romer 1991 and Hansen and
Kessler 2001 among others).
12Dierent measures of inequality are increasing in  for the lognormal distribution, for example the
variance of income, V ar(y) = e+
2
(e
2   1) or the ratio of mean income to median income, yym = e
2
2 .
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If the part of the immobile population in the economy is lower than the threshold, i.e.
 < ~, there is no stratication equilibrium. If the part of the immobile population
is higher than the threshold, i.e.  > ~, there exists a stratication equilibrium, i.e.
t2   t1 > 0.
Figure 2, Panel A shows that there is a threshold level of part of the immobile
population ~ (here ~ = 0:325 for  = 0:5) from which on the dierence between the tax
rates is positive and thus a stratication equilibrium exists. At the left of this threshold
a stratication equilibrium cannot exist regardless in which of the two jurisdictions the
rich move as the jurisdiction in which the rich have moved will feature a higher inequality
and thus a higher tax rate.
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Figure 2: Relationship between the degree of mobility and the dierence between tax
rates
If there is no stratication equilibrium, a natural question to raise is what happens
instead? From a theoretical standpoint it is clear: There is simply no stable equilib-
rium in the metropolitan area.13 Empirically, we would observe migration that proceeds
13Decentralized political and locational choice may not produce a stable equilibrium solution. Strat-
ication is not a general outcome of locational equilibrium models as contributions by Rose-Ackerman
(1979), Epple and Platt (1998), Hansen and Kessler (2001) show. Westho (1977) constructs a model
with a pure public good and shows that equilibria income sorting equilibria can exist. Nechyba (1997)
states conditions for the equilibrium to be stratied
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uninterruptedly and frequent changes in tax rates.
4.4 The role of overall inequality
The overall variance of the income distribution among individuals plays a crucial role for
the threshold level ~. Consider the four cases for  in Panel B of Figure 2. The higher
the initial variance in the income distribution the bigger is the range of possible values
for the part of the immobile population from which on a stratication equilibrium arises.
A numerical approximation of the threshold ~; implicitely dened in Proposition 3, as a
function of the variance conrms this nding as shown in Figure 3.14
Figure 3: The Threshold Immobility
In the gure we can see that as the variance  increases the threshold ~ becomes
smaller, that is even a small fraction of immobile individuals is already sucient to lead
to a stratication equilibrium, if the overall variance in income is high. This can also be
shown formally as summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If  ! 1, there is always a stratication equilibrium independent of
the part of the immobile population in the economy.
Intuitively, a higher overall variance  translates also into a higher variance for indi-
vidual jurisdictions after migration as it also represents the variance in incomes in the
14The numerical approximation is done using a cubic-spline-approximation method. For more details
on function approximation methods see Judd (1998) or Miranda and Fackler (2002).
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immobile population which does not change. Because of the nature of the lognormal
distribution median income is not aected by , but mean income is. Thus, inequality
rises but simultaneously average incomes rise.15 Intuitively, it is easier for the "poor" to
agree on a higher tax rate in the poor jurisdiction as here the mean has moved farther
away from the median (i.e. inequality has risen more dramatically), when the overall
variance is high. Moreover, in the rich jurisdiction, even a slightly lower tax rate has a
relatively large eect on individual welfare of inhabitants, as they are "very rich" (higher
mean income) compared to a situation where the overall variance is lower. But a slightly
lower tax rate has a relatively small eect on the grants, because the tax base is larger,
but not as much larger as the high incomes are. Thus, when the overall variance is
high, the social loss from a lower tax rate is smaller than the individual gain from it.
The result is that income stratication equilibria are more likely, when the overall mean
income is high relative to the median (as measured by ).
5 Conclusion
Dierences in the degree of mobility between groups together with the overall regional
inequality can have important implications on local redistribution in a federal system.
Mobility itself is often seen as a constraint on local redistribution as it is usually believed
to undermine local income redistribution in federal systems, because rich taxpayers can
evade taxes by moving to "tax havens". Our main theoretical result suggests that even
though out-migration possibilities may aect the potential for redistribution, income
sorting in an asymmetric equilibrium (stratication) is not a general outcome and sig-
nicant local redistribution may be feasible even when people are mobile.
We analyze local redistribution in a political economy model where local governments
have tax-grant instruments, part of the population is mobile and voters are aware of
migration eects of taxes and grants. This setting allows us to focus explicitly on the
relationship between mobility, income inequality and redistribution. Our theoretical
model leads to three predictions: (1) When inequality in the economy is high dierences
between inhabitants of local jurisdictions make stratication and thus low redistribution
levels a likely outcome which is itself independent of the degree of mobility. (2) When
part of the population is immobile, income sorting may arise as part of the rich immobile
are exploited by the poor mobile while the rich mobile may escape taxes. For high levels
of immobility stratication is less likely as only few people migrate and their inuence
on inequality is not suciently high. (3) Finally, despite high mobility, sorting may not
arise as rich taxpayers are too unequal between each other.
15For the lognormal distribution the mean is y = e+
2
2 for a parameters  and .
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Summarizing our results, we nd that local income redistribution in a federal system
is feasible if income inequality in the federation is not too high and mobility is not at an
intermediate degree.
However, one has to be cautious when drawing immediate political conclusions from
our results as we abstract certain institutional and political features of local jurisdictions
given our single focus on redistribution and mobility. For example, we look at a purely
redistributive setting instead of assuming a local public good which enters directly the
utility function and we abstract from a housing market. Another, interesting extension to
our current model would be to investigate a similar setting where mobility is endogenous
and depends, for example, on income or wealth. Additionally, it would be interesting to
include the long term decision of buying a house and thereby including possible capital
gains and losses to the house due to capitalization of redistributive policies. Furthermore
it would be very interesting to investigate empirically the relationship between mobility
and income stratication. All this is left to future research.
6 Appendix (Proofs)
Proof of Lemma 2
Distribution functions
In the jurisdiction 1, the low tax jurisdiction, only immobile individuals have an income
below the boundary, so that for y  ~y we have:
G1(y) = F (y)
There are two kinds of people with income above the boundary: (1) immobile with
distribution F (y) and (2) mobile with distribution (1   )F (y) F (~y)
1 F (~y) (the fraction of
people that have income between ~y and y divided by the total fraction of people with
income above ~y). Thus we have the following distribution for people with income y > ~y:
G1(y) = F (y) + (1  )F (y)  F (~y)
1  F (~y)
= (2  )F (y)  (1  ):
as xM = 1  F (~y) = 1
2
. The distribution of the population in jurisdiction 1 over income
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will thus have two dierent parts:
G1(y) =
(
F (y) y  ~y
(2  )F (y)  (1  ) y > ~y
Similarly, one can show for jurisdiction 2, the high tax jurisdiction:
G2(y) =
(
(2  )F (y) y  ~y
(1  ) + F (y) y > ~y :
Mean incomes
In the low tax jurisdiction, jurisdiction 1, all immobile people have an mean income
given by the original mean income,
R max y
0
yf(y)dy and all mobile people have a higher
mean income given by
R max y
~y
y f(y)
1 F (~y)dy (where the density is just weighted by the total
fraction of individuals with income higher than the boundary and the support is from
the boundary to the maximum income). Thus, mean income in jurisdiction 1 is
y1 = 
max yZ
0
yf(y)dy + (1  )
max yZ
~y
y
f(y)
1  F (~y)dy
= 
max yZ
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1  )
max yZ
~y
yf(y)dy;
and similarly for jurisdiction 2:
y2 = 
max yZ
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1  )
~yZ
0
yf(y)dy:
Medians
Principally there are four dierent cases for the relationship between median income and
the income of the boundary mobile individuum:
1. ym  ~y in both communities,
2. ym1  ~y and ym2  ~y,
3. ym1  ~y and ym2  ~y,
4. ym  ~y in both communities.
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We want to show that we must be in case 2 and that the medians are given by
equations (5) and (6). To do this, we will proceed in the following order. First we will
show that if we are in case 2 the medians must be equal to (5) and (6). Then, we will
show that given those medians we must be in case 2.
Part 1 Suppose ym1  ~y and ym2  ~y. Then the median in jurisdiction 1 is implicitely
dened as:
G1(y
m
1 ) = (2  )F (ym1 )  (1  ) =
1
2
ym1 = F
 1

1
2
3  2
2  

:
Similarly for the median in jurisdiction 2 we then have:
G2(y
m
2 ) = (2  )F (ym2 ) =
1
2
ym2 = F
 1

1
2
1
2  

We procede in the same manner
Part 2 Suppose the medians are given by ym1 = F
 1  1
2
3 2
2 

and ym2 = F
 1  1
2
1
2 

.
This implies
ym1 = F
 1

1
2
3  2
2  

 ~y = F 1

1
2

for all   1
as 3 2
2   1 for all   1 and F 1(:) is a monotonously increasing function. Similarly:
ym2 = F
 1

1
2
1
2  

 ~y = F 1

1
2

for all   1
as 1
2   1 for all   1 and F 1(:) is a monotonously increasing function. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1 shows that if a stratication equilibrium exists, t2() > t

1() must hold. It
remains to be shown that if t2() > t

1() then we will have a stratication equilibrium.
The remainder of this proof closely follows Hansen and Kessler (2001). Suppose, we have
t2() > t

1(). Note that we must have a lower grant-rent dierential in jurisdiction 1, i.e.
(t1(); g

1()   r1()) < (t2(); g2()   r2()). Otherwise, if the grant-rent dierential
was bigger in jurisdiction 1, everyone would like to live in jurisdiction 1. As all the
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jurisdictions must be populated and there is no extra space in jurisdiction 1. There
would be an over-demand for living in jurisdiction 1 and the price of housing would rise
there until the grant-rent dierential becomes smaller than in jurisdiction 2 and some
individuals agree to live in jurisdiction 2.
What can be inferred about the distribution of mobile individuals over income in
each jurisdiction? The ones that prefer a higher grant-rent to a lower tax rate will
move to jurisdiction 2 while individuals preferring a lower tax rate to a higher grant-rent
dierential will move to jurisdiction 1. Totally dierentiating shows that the slope of an
indierence curve spanned by t and g   r is positive and increasing in income, i.e.
d(gj   rj)
dti

V=V
= y > 0:
Thus, low-income individuals prefer regions with higher taxes combined with large
grant-rent dierentials, whereas high-income individuals prefer regions with low taxes
and high grant-rent dierentials. Consequently, from the fact that not everyone can
live in jurisdiction, (t1(); g

1()   r1()) < (t2(); g2()   r2()) and that the relative
preference for lower taxes versus a higher grant-rent dierential depends on income, we
can conclude that a stratication equilibrium must arise. Individuals up to a certain
boundary income ~y live in jurisdiction 2 and individuals with higher income than the
boundary ~y live in jurisdiction 1. 
Derivation of results of Example 1
Using Lemma 1 and and the distribution function given in the example we obtain for
 = 0:
ym1 = F
 1

3
4

= 1 +
2
3
=
5
3
, y1 = 2
2Z
1
3
8
ydy + 2
3Z
2
1
8
ydy =
7
4
) t1 =
1
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ym2 = F
 1

1
4

=
1
2
, y2 = 2
1Z
0
1
2
ydy =
1
2
) t2 = 0
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and for  = 1
3
:
ym1 = F
 1

7
10

= 1 +
4
9
=
23
15
, y1 =
1
3
y +
4
3
24 2Z
1
3
8
ydy +
3Z
2
1
8
ydy
35 = 37
24
) t1 =
1
185
ym2 = F
 1

3
10

=
3
5
, y2 =
1
3
y +
4
3
1Z
0
1
2
ydy =
17
24
) t2 =
13
85
Proof of Proposition 3
First we derive the equation that denes the threshold (equation (7)) and then we show
that the threshold really exists and is unique. For the lognormal distribution we have
F (y) = 1
2
+ 1
2
erf

ln(y) 

p
2

by denition with an overall mean given by y = exp

+ 
2
2

and an overall median given by ym = exp () : We now calculate the means and the
medians for this distribution.
Means
We can write Z 1
ym
yf(y)dy = exp

+
2
2

()
and Z ym
0
yf(y)dy = exp

+
2
2

(1  ())
where  is cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Thus equations (3)
and (4) become
y1 =  exp

+
2
2

+ 2(1  ) exp

+
2
2

()
= exp

+
2
2

[+ 2(1  )()]
and
y2 = exp

+
2
2

[+ 2(1  ) (1  ())] :
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Medians
For the log normal distribution we obtain for ym1 :
F (ym1 ) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf

ln(ym1 )  

p
2

=
1
2
3  2
2  
ym1 = exp


p
2 erf 1

1  
2  

+ 

and for ym2 :
F (ym2 ) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf

ln(ym2 )  

p
2

=
1
2
1
2  
ym2 = exp

 
p
2 erf 1

1  
2  

+ 

Dierence between tax rates
Using the means and medians, we can now calculate the dierence between tax rates
t2   t1 = 1  y
m
2
y2
  1 + y
m
1
y1
=
ym1
y1
  y
m
2
y2
=
exp
 

p
2 erf 1
 
1 
2 

+ 

exp
 
+ 
2
2

[+ 2(1  )()]  
exp
  p2 erf 1  1 
2 

+ 

exp
 
+ 
2
2

[+ 2(1  ) (1  ())]
=
1
exp
 
2
2
  exp  p2 erf 1  1 2 
[+ 2(1  )()]  
exp
  p2 erf 1  1 
2 

[+ 2(1  ) (1  ())]
!
:
This shows (7).
Existence and uniqueness of stratication threshold
We would like to show formally that there exists a unique stratication threshold for the
case of two communities with equal immobility rates. We proceed in four steps:
1. Show that t2   t1 = 0 at  = 1 for all  > 0:
2. Show that t2   t1 < 0 at  = 0 for all  > 0:
3. Show that there must be at least one  for which t2 t1 = 0 in the interval  2 [0; 1[:
4. Show that there at most one  for which t2   t1 = 0 in the interval  2 [0; 1[:
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Part 1 First, one can easily show that for any  the tax dierential (7) is equal to
zero at  = 1:
t2   t1 = 1
exp
 
2
2
 
exp
 

p
2 erf 1 (0)
  1  exp   p2 erf 1 (0)  1
1
!
= 0
Part 2 At  = 0 we will have for (7)
t2   t1 = 1
exp
 
2
2
 
exp
 

p
2 erf 1
 
1
2

2 (1  ())  exp   p2 erf 1  1
2

2()
4 (1  ()) ()
!
To see that this must be below zero for all  consider the numerator (substituting
constant terms with c =
p
2 erf 1
 
1
2

> 0 for simplicity)
exp (c) (1  ())  exp ( c) ()
= exp (c) (1  ())  exp ( c) (1  ( ))
= H() H( )
This shows that the numerator is the dierence of a functionH(x) = exp (cx) (1  (x))
at some point above zero with itself at some point below zero. Clearly if this function is
decreasing this dierence must be negative. The derivative of this function is given by
H 0(x) = c exp(cx)(1  (x)) + exp(cx)( (x))
= exp(cx) [c(1  (x))  (x)]
This derivative is negative because (1) the exponential term is positive and (2) the
term in brackets is always negative. To see this consider
c(1  (x))  (x) < 0
c =
p
2 erf 1
 
1
2

( 0:67449) < min
h
(x)
(1 (x))
i
( 0:79789)  (x)
(1  (x)) :
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Part 3 Consider the rst derivative of the tax dierential with respect to the im-
mobility rate:
@(t2   t1)
@
=
1
exp
 
2
2
 exp(k1q()) [k1q0()v1()  v01()]
v1()2
 exp(k2q()) [k2q
0()v2()  v02()]
v2()2

where we dened
k1 =  k2 = 
p
2
q() = erf 1

1  
2  

q0() =
p

2
exp
 
q()2
  1
(2  )2

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v01() = (1  2())
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v02() = (1  2( )):
At  = 1 this rst derivative is equal to
1
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This means that there is at least one intersection with zero in the interval [0; 1[,
because the tax dierential function intersects at the point  = 1 from above. From part
1 we know that at  = 1 the tax dierence t2  t1 = 0 and from part 2 that at  = 0 the
tax dierence is t2   t1 < 0. This also implies that the number of intersections in the
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interval [0; 1[ has to be odd.
Part 4 To see that there is a unique intersection expand (7) and set the numerator
to zero
exp


p
2 erf 1
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1  
2  

[+ 2(1  ) (1  ())]
  exp

 
p
2 erf 1
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[+ 2(1  )()] = 0
exp
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 2
p
2 erf 1

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2  

 
1  (1  ) erf

p
2

1 + (1  ) erf

p
2
 = 0
m()  n() = 0
Note that we have already shown that n(0) > m(0) for any . If we can show that
n() and m() are both convex increasing functions, then it is clear that they have at
most two intersections. See, Figure 4 as an illustration for  = 1.
Figure 4: Proof of unique Stratication Threshold: An Illustration
Together with part 3 of the proof, where we have shown that there must be at least
one threshold, this would complete the proof that the threshold is unique.
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That the function n() is a convex increasing function is easy to show:
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The function h() is also clearly an increasing function:
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But at a rst glance it is not clearly convex or concave:
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The term in square brackets determines, if this second derivative is positive or nega-
tive, because all other terms are positive.
As a preliminary consider that on the interval  2 [0; 1[ we have:
0  erf 1

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<
1
2
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2
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1
4
Now we want to show that the square brackets are positive. We split the square
brackets into two terms p1(), the positive part, and  p2(), the negative part:
p1() = 4 + exp
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where we will show that p1() > p2(), which means that the term in square brackets
must be positive. Instead of comparing p1() and p2() we can also compare the lower
bound of p1() with respect to  on the given interval: min [p1()]  p1() for all  2
[0; 1[ with an upper bound of p2() with respect to  on the given interval: max [p2()] 
p2() for all  2 [0; 1[. Those boundaries are given by:
min

[p1()] = 4 +
p
2
max

[p2()] = 2 + exp

1
4

1
2
p

Comparing them we see that
4 +
p
2 > 2 + exp

1
4

1
2
p
( 3:1379) for all   0
which completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the dierence between tax rates:
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We want to show that:
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Rewrite the tax dierence as follows:
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First note that the numerators limiting value is constant:
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The second term thus goes to zero:
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The rst term also goes to zero because the square term dominates:
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